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Abstract:
This paper offers an explanation for the persistence observed in real exchange rate
movements.  The model combines pricing to market behavior with sticky prices
generated by staggered contracts. A translog preference structure is used to enhance both
features.  The paper finds that openness limits the degree of endogenous persistence.
Nevertheless, the model under reasonable parameter values can replicate the serial
correlation of real exchange rate data.  Further, significant exchange rate volatility can be
generated, and this is amplified by the presence of endogenous persistence.
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Aprominentquestionininternationalmacroeconomicsiswhyrealexchangeratesexhibit
persistent deviations from purchasing power parity. Table 1 reiterates the basic findings of the
preceding literature, using quarterly data for 1973-1997.1 Averaging over countries, the one-
quarter autocorrelation is about 0.8, and that over four quarters is 0.27.2 A related time-series
literature concludes that the real exchange rate may be even more persistent.3 In addition, the
table shows the real exchange rate is quite volatile, with a standard deviation between four to
five times that of output on average.
Sticky prices are one explanation commonly offered for these real exchange rate move-
ments. Monetary shocks could induce an immediate change in the nominal exchange rate,
and this would translate into a change in the real exchange rate if national price levels remain
fixed. IntertemporalmodelspresentingthisgeneralviewincludeSvenssonandvanWijnbergen
(1989), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), and Kollmann (1996).
A second explanation focuses on pricing-to-market, in which a firm intentionally sets
different prices for its good across segmented national markets.4 This explanation is consis-
tent with empirical work by Engel (1993), Knetter (1993) and others, which have documented
4 The table closely resembles standard findings in the real business cycle literature: see Backus, Kehoe, and
Kydland (1992), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1998a), and Chang and Devereux (1998).
5 All data are logged and Hodrick-Prescott filtered quarterly series. The real exchange rate is computed as the
CPI-adjusted bilateral exchange rate with the U.S. dollar. If we do not Hodrick-Prescott filter the real exchange
rate data, the average serial correlation naturally is much higher: 0.94 for one quarter and 0.71 for four quarters.
6 See Froot and Rogoff (1995) for a summary of the time series literature. Several studiessuggest real exchange
rate deviations have a half-life of about four to five years. Some studies, such as Engel (1999), cast doubt on
whether the real exchange rate is even mean reverting.
7 A related explanation for deviations from the law of one price, suggested in Devereux (1997), is that prices
are sticky in the local currency of the buyer.
1significant deviations from the law of one price. First developed in a partial equilibrium set-
ting (see Dornbusch (1987), Krugman (1987), Knetter (1989) and Marston (1990)), pricing-to-
market has been adapted to general equilibrium settings by Betts and Devereux (1996, 1998),
Chang and Devereux (1998), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1998a), and Devereux and Engel
(1998).
Nevertheless, the persistence of real exchange rate movements has posed a significant
challengeto theoretical models. Chang and Devereux(1998)find that without pricestickiness,
a model of pricing-to-market cannot generate adequate persistence. Chari, et al. (1998a) find
that sticky prices can help replicate persistence in the data, but only if one is willing to accept
long-lived price contracts, which set prices for at least three years. It is generally thought that
price-setting contracts are shorter than this in practice, and that it would be desirable to have a
model in which prices and real exchange rate deviations last longer than the rigidity imposed
exogenously by the contract. This is called endogenous persistence. In principle, overlapping
contracts of the type described by Taylor (1980) and Blanchard (1983) should generate such
endogenous persistence. However, Chari, et al. (1998a) find this is not the case in a general
equilibrium setting.
The present paper will consider an extension of the two-country model of Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1995), augmented to allow for pricing-to-market and staggered price contracts. The
model incorporates several features that Bergin and Feenstra (1998) found useful in generating
endogenous persistence in a closed economy context. These features include a translog de-
mand structure and a particular production structure proposed by Basu (1995). Kimball (1995)
discusses the importance of a demand with a nonconstant elasticity for generating significant
real effects of monetary shocks. The translog specification we develop here is one example
which has the virtue of analytical tractability. It has been argued in Bergin and Feenstra (1998)
that a demand structure with a nonconstant elasticity is necessary in a general equilibrium set-
2ting to generate the interactions of staggered price setters envisioned by Taylor and Blanchard.
The present paper demonstrates that such a demand structure is likewise necessary to generate
genuine pricing-to-market.
The paper finds that a greater degree of openness in an economy, by its nature, limits the
degree of endogenous persistence. The presenceofforeign goods causes thedomesticpricein-
dex to adjust morequickly to a monetary shock. Nevertheless, forreasonableparameter values
the model can generate a significant amount of endogenous persistence in the real exchange
rate. The model produces more persistence than past studies, and for reasonable parameter
values, it is able to replicate the serial correlations in the data used as a benchmark in this liter-
ature. Translog preferences and the production structure play key roles in this result. It is also
found that the model can generate exchange rate overshooting and significant exchange rate
volatility. Finally, there appears to be interactions between volatility and persistence. For ex-
ample, greater persistence tends to amplify exchange rate overshooting and thereby the degree
of volatility.
The next section of the paper discusses the model framework. Results are presented in
sectionthree,firstdiscussingpersistenceoftherealexchangerateandthendiscussingvolatility.
We obtain analytical results for a particular set of preference parameters, and simulation results
for other parameter values. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1 Households
Consider a model of two countries, hereafter referred to as home and foreign. Variables
in the foreign country will be denoted by an asterisk. In addition, when necessary for clarity a
subscript  will denote a variable originating in the home country; a subscript s will denote a
3variable in originating in the foreign country.
The households in the home country are endowed each period with one unit of time,
which they divide between leisure and work. They consume a continuum of differentiated
goods. Home households can hold three types of nominal assets: non-interest bearing home
money(), interestbearingone-periodnominaldebtdenominatedinthecurrencyofthehome
country (￿), or debt denominated in the currency of the foreign country (s). Money holding
ismotivatedthroughtheutilityfunction. Householdincomeisderivedfromsellinglabor(u)to
firms at wage rate (`), profits from firms (), from the interest received on bonds (at rates -
and-W),andlump-sumgovernmenttransfers(A). LetL representthesub-utilityobtainedfrom
consumption of the differentiated products, and let  be the home unit price index consistent
with this consumption composite. Let 7 denote the nominal exchange rate, defined as the
domestic currency price of one unit of foreign exchange. International linkages in the model
workthroughhouseholdtradeinthegoodsandbondmarkets. Thereisnotradeinfirmequities,
and no international mobility in labor. As in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), there is no capital
accumulation in the model.5






































for j￿ ' cj 2 '
(1)
8 In Bergin and Feenstra (1998), it is demonstrated that capital accumulation has only very small effects on per-
sistence generated by the mechanisms of the type used in this paper. In fact for reasonable investment adjustment
costs, capital accumulation can even somewhat increase the persistence of real effects following a nominal shock.
We do not discuss this issue in detail here, because the focus of the present paper is exchange rate determination
rather than business cycles.
9 Chari, et. al. (1998) demonstrate that preferences separable in leisure are important for generating real ex-
change rate volatility.









The analytical results in this paper will focus mainly on the case of complete financial
markets, although the alternative case of incomplete markets will be considered in model sim-
ulations. The benchmark case assumes a complete set of contingent assets that can be traded to
perfectly share all risks between home and foreign households. This implies an optimization
problem that maximizes the sum of (1) and its foreign counterpart, subject to the budget con-
straint (2) combined with its foreign counterpart, once converted to domestic currency terms
using the nominal exchange rate 7|.
The first-order conditions for this problem include the home intertemporal Euler equa-
tion:









































5Notethat theintertemporal condition (3)along with its foreign counterpart and therisk-sharing

























For the alternative case of incomplete markets, we assume the only assets traded are the
noncontingent nominal bonds. This implies two distinct optimization problems, one regarding
homepreferences (1)subject to thehome budget constraint (2), and theotherregarding foreign
counterparts. Consequently, the risk sharing condition (6) does not hold. This is replaced by



















implied by the home national budget constraint.
As in Bergin and Feenstra (1998), we will allow the sub-utility, L,i ne q u a t i o n( 1 )t ob e
defined by the dual expenditure function, which is assumed to have a translog form.7 This
unit-expenditure function is defined by:










￿￿ *?￿| *?￿| (9)
where ￿ is the price of good  and where ￿￿ ' ￿￿. In order for this function to be homoge-










: That is, given nominal expenditure Hw, the sub-utility from consumption of the differentiated products 1,...,N
is Xw @ Hw@i+S4w>===>SQw,. We do not use the notation Hw for nominal expenditure in the text, but reserve this
for the expectation operator.
6We can differentiate the unit-expenditure function to obtain the expenditure shares, ￿:









The (positive) elasticity of demand for each differentiated product in the home country is com-




￿￿|,w h e r e￿￿ 	 f is needed to ensure that demand is elastic.
While the equations above are the general case of the translog function, we can consider
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for  9'  (13)
This choice of parameters satisfies the homogeneity conditions (10), and expressing the para-
meters as a ratio to  ensures that the elasticity of demand remains bounded above even as 
b e c o m e sl a r g e ,a sw ew i s ht oc o n s i d e ri nt h i sp a p e r . 8
2.2 Firm’s Problem
Firms sell their output to consumers, and also to other firms as intermediate inputs. Both
thefinalgoodsandintermediateinputswillbetradedinternationally, thoughweshallintroduce







; Note that we do not allow Q to vary endogenously. Allowing Q to approach infinity is just a simplifying
device.
7where u| refers to the demand for labor by home firms, with cost-share wc and where ~| is a
composite intermediate input. (An analogous expression, with asterisks on all variables, holds
for foreign production.) The composite intermediate input ~| is itself a translog aggregate
of the home and foreign product varieties, using exactly the same functional form as for the
translog expenditure function introduced above. Thus, the elasticity of demand for each final
good will be identical to the elasticity of demand for each intermediate input, as given by
#￿| '
￿￿￿
￿￿|cwith the share of each (final or intermediate) variety given by (11).
Denote the marginal cost of producing in the home country by | Given the Cobb-
Douglas production function in (14), the marginal costs are also a Cobb-Douglas function of




where `| is the nominal wage paid to labor, and | is the aggregate price index. The same
expression for marginal costs holds abroad, with an asterisk added to each variable. Because
the production functions are Cobb-Douglas, they imply constant expenditure shares on the two







Firms are assumed able to set a different price in the local currency in each country.
Consider the problem for a firm located in the home country. Let ￿ be the price set by the firm
for sale of the good in the home country, and  W
￿ for sale in the foreign country. Consider the
case in which there are two groups of price setters in each country, each setting a price for two
periods in staggered fashion. Firms are assumed to set their prices after observing the money
shock for the first period of the contract, but before observing the shock for the second period.
Denote the demand for product  in the home country as (f￿| n ~￿| and the demand in the
foreign country as (fW
￿| n ~W
















































The expenditure shares, ￿c can be substituted from (11), and then (17 and 18) can be
solved for the optimal prices, in terms of marginal cost and the prices of competitors. This
expression is nonlinear (involving ￿| and ln ￿|), so we will take an approximation to allow









￿￿￿ (which is valid for ￿| small). Substituting for ￿| from condition (11)

















































For analytical simplicity, the analysis below will make the approximation of q   Simula-
tions will be used later to demonstrate this approximation has only a very minor effect on the
persistence implied by the model.
This implies that a permanent 1% exchange rate depreciation induces the home firm to
lower its price on a product sold in the foreign country by 50%, all else constant. This ’’pass
9through’’ coefficient of one-half is a feature of the translog demand equations.9 Empirically,
this is a reasonable value for the response of price to a change in costs, while holding competi-
tors prices constant.10
To simplify the pricing equations, we need to specify the number of home versus foreign
products that a typical home firm competes with. To reflect transportation costs or other trade
barriers,wewillsupposethatnotallthegoodsaretradedinternationally. Thus,theoptimization
problemspecifiedin(16)appliestoatradedvariety, whileforanon-tradedvarietyonlythefirst
part of the objective function (profits from home sales) would appear. Since the profits from
home and foreign sales are independent (due to our assumption of constant marginal cost), the
choice of home prices in (19) is not affected by whether that good is traded or not.
However, the choice of home prices will be affected by how many of the foreign goods
are traded. In particular, suppose that a fraction  of all products sold in the home country
are produced in the home country, and number these  ' cc . The remaining varieties
 '  ncc are produced in the foreign country and sold at home. We will be supposing
that :*2, reflecting the presence of some nontraded goods and ’’home market bias.’’ In
steady state, home firms represent a fraction  of the home market and a fraction E   of
the foreign market.
We also must specify the structure of overlapping contracts. In each country we assume
there are two equally-sized groups of firms setting prices in two-period contracts in staggered
fashion. Home firms in group one choose their prices for the home and foreign markets in
period |,w h e r e| is an odd number, and these prices are then fixed for periods | and | n .L e t
us denote these prices by ￿￿| and W
￿￿|, which are assumed to be the same across all firms in
< This result is invariant to the number of contracting groups and the number of periods in the contract. For a
discussion of the general N-period contract case, see Bergin and Feenstra (1998).
43 See Moffet (1988) for a summary of studies with estimates around 50%.
10group one. As a group, these firms then represent a fraction
￿
2 of the home goods market and
a fraction
￿3￿
2 of the foreign market in steady state. Similarly, the firms in group two choose
their prices ￿2| and W
￿2| in even periods |, which are then fixed for | and | n .T h e s a m e
applies to two groups of firms in the foreign country, setting prices s￿|, W
s￿|, s2| and W
s2| in
staggered fashion.
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2.3 Pricing to Market and Preferences
The four price-setting equations above (21 - 24) show that home bias in consumption prefer-
ences () plays an important role in generating pricing-to-market behavior by firms. Pricing-
to-market has been defined in Marston (1990) as the behavior of a firm to intentionally choose
different prices for its good in segmented national markets. Consider the case in which we
allow our two symmetric countries to have fully open goods markets with no home bias in
preferences, so that  'f D and the home market is split evenly between home and foreign
producers. In this case pricing equations (21) and (22) are identical, meaning that the home
firm sets the same price in the home and the foreign market, once converted to the same cur-
rency. In this case the law of one price is satisfied and there is no pricing-to-market. Firms
have the ability to set different prices in different markets, but there is no reason to do so if the
two markets are identical. For example, a change in marginal costs will be passed on equally
to the home and foreign price.
Consider next the case where there is home bias (:fD). Now home and foreign
markets differ in the composition of competitors that a firm faces. In this case a firm faced
with a rise in marginal cost will raise price more at home than abroad (by the factor *Ee 
compared to *E n ). The firm feels more free to raise the home price in the face of rising
home wages, for example, because it knows that other home firms are affected similarly and
will want to raise their prices as well, and these home firms comprise a larger fraction of the
competitors in the home market.
Similarly, the translog preference structure, which underlies the pricing equations above,
is also important for pricing-to-market. Demand with a non-constant elasticity was assumed in
the development of pricing-to-market in Dornbusch (1987), Krugman (1987), Knetter (1989)
12and Marston (1990). Suppose we reconsidered our model using preferences with a constant
elasticity of substitution of 1. As is well-known, prices are then a constant markup over mar-





















Competitor’s prices do not appear in these two pricing rules. Bergin and Feenstra (1998)
argue that such pricing rules cannot give rise to the type of interactions between price setters
required for staggered contracts to give rise to endogenous persistence, as envisioned in Tay-
lor(1980) and Blanchard (1983). We further argue here that such pricing rules cannot give rise
to genuine pricing-to-market, in that firms will not intentionally choose to set different prices
between the two markets. The two pricing rules are identical, except for the currency adjust-
ment. A change in marginal cost () will have the same effect on both prices. An anticipated
change in the exchange rate (7) will be fully passed through, so that when measured in a com-
mon currency, the two prices are identical and the law of one price is satisfied. It is true that
if prices are pre-set in the currency of the buyer, an unanticipated change in the exchange rate
will drive a temporary wedge between the home and foreign price. Although this phenomenon
has sometimes of late been characterized as pricing-to-market, it is distinct from the definition
given above, and is best described as ’’local-currency-pricing’’ as in Devereux (1997).11
44 Friberg (1998) has explored conditions under which it is be optimal for firms to invoice in the currency of the
importer, as we assume. He likewise finds that a sufficient condition for firms to exhibit such invoicing behavior
is that the demand have less convexity than the CES case.
132.4 Equilibrium Conditions
For large , the demand functions (12) may be written for each good sold at home:








where f￿| is demand for the home good by households in the home country and fs| is de-
m a n df o rt h ef o r e i g ng o o di nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y .( T h e s em u s ta l s ob eu s e di nl i n e a r i z e df o r m . )
Precisely the same set of expressions holds for foreign demand, where we add an asterisk onto
each variable. In addition, analogous sets of expressions hold for domestic and foreign inter-
mediate demands, where we replace the consumption index L| with the intermediate inputs
index ~|
Money is introduced by the government as a lump-sum transfer, defined as:







It is assumed that money is exogenously supplied.
Equilibrium forthis economy is acollection of31 sequences (￿|, s|,  W
￿|,  W
s|, , W, ,
W, `, `W, L, LW, f￿|, fs|, fW
￿|, fW
s|, ~￿|, ~s|, ~W
￿|, ~W
s|, ~, ~W, t , t W, u, uW, ￿|, s|, W
￿|,
W
s|,a n d7|) satisfying 31 equilibrium conditions.12 These include the four pricing conditions
(21, 22, 23, 24), the definition of the price indexes (25 and 26), the four demand equations (29,
30, and foreign counterparts), six household optimality conditions (3, 4, 5, and foreign coun-
terparts), the risk-sharing condition (6), the two production functions (14 and foreign counter-
part), the allocation between intermediates and labor (15 and the foreign counterpart), and four
45 Weconsolidatethebudget constraintsofthehousehold, governmentandfirmineachcountryintotwonational
budget constraints, thereby dropping the variables W>W￿, ,a n d￿.
14demand equations for intermediates, analogous to those for consumption.13 Finally, there are
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Under incomplete markets, condition (6) is replaced by (8).
3. Results
3.1 Solving Analytically
We now evaluate the effects of combining pricing-to-market with staggered contracts
under a translog demand structure. To facilitate an analytical solution, we initially choose
convenientvalues forparameters in theutility function. In particular, weconsiderabenchmark
case where j￿ ' j2 'and j￿ 'f . This produces the same utility formulation as used for
analytical results in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).14 Under the assumption of j￿ ' j2 ' ,t h e
46 The household problem implies two pairs of redundant equations regarding the holding of home and foreign
bonds. Theredundancyisdealtwithbyintroducingtwoarbitrarybondallocationrules,suggestingthathouseholds
adjust their holdings of home and foreign bonds in a fixed proportion.
47 This has the implication of an infinite labor supply elasticity. But this will be demonstrated later to have a
negligible effect on persistence in the present model.
15linearized forms of (3) and (4) jointly imply:15
.| dR|n￿ n |n￿o'

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where we use lower case letters to represent percent deviations from the initial deterministic
steady state. This is a difference equation in nominal expenditure (R| n |), with the stable
solution:
R| n | ' 6| (37)
This implies that a permanent one percent increase in money supply translates into an equal
permanent one percent increasein nominal expenditure. Theinitial impact on real final output,
|, depends on the degree to which the price level can respond. And the persistence of this real
effect depends on the dynamics of the price level (25) and hence on the price-setting rules (21
- 24). In an analogous manner, the same can be shown for foreign real final output, W
|.
This conclusion can also be demonstrated for the real exchange rate. In linear form, the
risk-sharing condition (6) implies:
|  
W
| ' r| n R
W
|  R| ' ^| (38)
where the right-hand side of this equation defines the percent change in the real exchange rate.
Since the dynamics of | and W
| depend entirely on the dynamics of the price-setting rules,
condition (38) implies this is true also for the real exchange rate.
Therefore, to gain insight into the persistence of both output and the real exchange rate,
we study the dynamics of the price-setting rules. These rules can be expressed in a simplified
form. First, under the assumption that j￿ 'fthe linearized form of the labor supply condition
48 Linearization of the model is not necessary for all the conclusions that follow.
16(5) implies in combination with (37) that:
| ' R| n | ' 6| (39)
As a result, the marginal cost term in the pricing equations, S|, may be expressed in terms of
the goods prices themselves and the exogenous money shock:
S| ' w| nE  wR| ' w6| nE  wR| (40)
Secondly, condition (38) implies that the nominal exchange rate likewise can be expressed in
terms of the money supply shocks:







Thefourpricingequations (21, 22, 23, 24)then maybeexpressed asasystem offourequations
in four endogenous price variables and the exogenous money shocks.
We wish to consider the model’s response to a domestic money shock. While it is not
feasible to solve analytically for the dynamics of each price individually, we can solve for
the dynamics of two especially useful linear combinations of these prices. Define the sum of
national prices, Z￿|, and the difference of national prices, Z2|:


















The appendix uses standard methods to show that the dynamics of these may be written as
Z￿c| ' @￿Z￿c|3￿ nE  @￿6| (44)




























costs, because the rise in marginal costs induces firms to raise price as they raise production.
See Bergin and Feenstra (1998) for a discussion. The term @￿ has a useful interpretation as the
persistence in total world output. Writing the world price index as R￿
| ' ￿









E  @￿E6| n 6|3￿ (48)













Since the percent deviation in world nominal expenditure was shown to be equal to the devia-








E n @￿E6|  6|3￿ (50)
The term @￿ is a useful measure of persistence in output movements. It is interpretable as both
the first-order first-order autoregressive coefficient and as the first-order autocorrelation.
The term @2 has an analogous interpretation as the persistence of the real exchange rate.
18In percent deviations, the real exchange rate may be written:
^| ' r| 

2
EZ2c| n Z2c|3￿ (51)
so that
^| ' @2^|3￿ n

2
E n @2E6|  6|3￿ (52)
The term @2 is the first-order autoregressive coefficient for real exchange rate deviations, as
well as an autocorrelation coefficient which may be compared to that reported in Table 1 for
actual data.
Much of the analysis above still applies under incomplete markets. The long-run steady
state is altered a small amount due to transfers of wealth between home and foreign house-
holds. The term @￿ is still the autocorrelation of total output, but @2 must be interpreted as the
autocorrelation relative to the new long-run steady state rather than the initial steady state. See
the appendix for details.
3.2 Implications for Persistence
Note that for the persistence indicators @￿ and @2 derived above, it is true that @2  @￿.
This indicates that persistence in the real exchange rate is less than that in real final output.
Only in the special case of complete home bias,  ' , do we have the two persistence indexes
coinciding. And as home bias falls, the persistence in the real exchange rate falls. This implies
thatthedegreeofpersistenceintherealexchangerateisdampenedbythedegreeof’’openness’’
in an economy.
This finding may be explained in more intuitive terms. The permanent depreciation in
the nominal exchange rate translates into a real depreciation only to the degree that the price
indexes in each country do not adjust in an offsetting way. However, the pricing equations (21
19- 24) imply that the components of the price indexes will respond more strongly to a nominal
devaluation if there is a greater degree of openness. For example, equation (24) indicates that
foreign producers will raise the price they charge in the home country when the home currency
depreciates. If foreign goods play a larger role in the home consumption basket, the overall
home price index will rise more. In addition, if foreign goods represent a larger fraction of
competitors in the home market, home producers will tend to raise their price in response.
This will further raise the home price index, offsetting the impact on the real exchange rate.16
Nevertheless, the model can generate significant persistence for some choices of the
parameters. Figure 1 depicts how the autocorrelation, @2, varies as a function of home bias, ,
and the share of labor in marginal cost, w. The share of intermediatesis w. The figureshows
that it is theoretically possible to generate nearly perfect persistence, with an autocorrelation of
approximately 1.0. But this requires that the economy approaches autarky, and that materials
comprise the entirety of marginal costs (  f, w 'f ). What are reasonable values for these
two parameters? First regarding home bias, data on the ratio of U.S. imports to GDP indicate
av a l u eo f 'f HD.
Second, Basu (1995) recommends a value for w between 0.10 and 0.20. This is based
on work by Jorgenson et al. (1987) estimating that the share of intermediates in total output is
50% or more. Basu (1995) transforms this ratio into   w, the ratio of expenditure on inputs
to total costs, using an estimate of the markup of 1.6 by Domowitz et al. (1988). Our model
does not have a constant markup, but in steady state this markup will be
￿n￿
￿ .B ys e t t i n g to
be 2, the model implies a steady state markup of 1.5.
Table 2 lists the autocorrelations implied by various levels of w, once the home bias has
been fixed at  'f HD. We can interpret each period of the model as a year and aim to
49 Thisfindingdoesnotoffsetpersistenceinworldoutput,becausethisinvolvesthesumofnationalpriceindexes,
which are affected in opposing directions and thus cancel.
20match the annual autocorrelation of 0.27 reported for the data in Table 1. Table 2 indicates that
intermediates play an essential role in achieving reasonable persistence. Note that the model
can match the autocorrelation in the data for any value of w under one-half, and any value in
the range recommended by Basu (f 	w	f2) produces more than enough persistence. For
example, thecaseofw 'f Dimpliesanautocorrelationof@2 'f H. Further, thispersistence
is achieved with a reasonable degree of exogenous price stickiness. Interpreting each period as
ayear,ourmodelfixespricesexogenouslyforonlyoneyear,atwhichpointallpricesettershave
had a change to reset their price at least once.17 By contrast, Chari, et.al. (1998a) require that
prices be fixed exogenously for at least three years to approach the exchange rate persistence
in the data.
As noted previously, a distinct but related time-series literature indicates a much higher
degree of real exchange rate persistence, compared to the serial correlations typically used as a
benchmark in the theoreticalliterature. Time-series studies have estimated a half-life of at least
four to five years for the real exchange rate as it returns to its mean, and some indicate the real
exchangeratemaynotbemeanrevertingatall. Asdiscussedintheappendix, theversionofour
model with incomplete asset markets technically can generate a real exchange rate that is not
mean-reverting. However, the permanent effect on the real exchange rate is small relative to
the initial impact, as will be discussed below, and this has a quantitatively insignificant impact
on the serial correlation and the half-life. Replicating the results of the time-series literature,
unfortunately, is beyond the scope of the present paper.
We can gain further intuition for the endogenous persistence by considering model sim-
ulations. The model is analyzed in linear form, in percent deviations from steady state. The
4: If we use data that is not Hodrick-Prescott filtered, the average annual autocorrelation in the real exchange
becomes0.71. Toreplicatethishigherbenchmark,wewouldneedtointerpreteachperiodinthemodelasbetween
two and three years in duration, and likewise impose exogenous price rigidity lasting two to three years.
21steady state affects this linearization only through the goods market clearing condition, which







We begin by calibrating the model with benchmark parameters. We set w 'f D, in the center
of the range recommended by Basu (1995). To be consistent with this, is set at 2. In addition,
we set  'f HD, as indicated by U.S. data for imports relative to GDP . To begin with, we use
the preference parameters used for analytical solution (j￿ ' j2 ' , j￿ 'f , q  ).
Our calibration of  '2 f implies a demand elasticity in steady state of n ' ,
which is not unreasonable. By contrast, the demand elasticity assumed by Kimball (1995) for
his demandcurve is 11. Kimball’s demand has been criticized by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan,
(1998b) as implying an unreasonable degree of curvature. In particular, it is found that a 2
percent increase in relative price results in a 78 percent reduction in Kimball’s demand relative
to steady state, and a 2.3 percent increase in relative price results in zero demand. This may be




















*?￿|*E  representsthe average price set bycompetitorsinthe market.
This impliesthata2 percent riseintherelativepriceofgoodfromsteady statelowers demand
by only 5 percent, and a 3 percent rise in relative price lowers demand by 8.7%. We conclude
that the criticism of Kimball’s demand structure does not apply here; the translog form implies
a very reasonable degree of curvature.
Figure 2 shows impulse responses in exchange rates and prices to the permanent one-
percent increase in home money supply. Again interpreting each period in the model as one
year, it is one year after the shock before both groups of price setters in each country have had
22a chance to reset their prices. Endogenous persistence then is the fraction of the effect in the
initial period of the shock that persists one year later. On impact of the shock, the nominal
exchange rate jumps immediately to its new long-run level of one percent above its initial
steady state level. The ratio of home to foreign price levels rises 31%, so the real exchange
rate depreciates 69%. One year after the shock, the real exchange rate is still depreciated 26%,
meaning that 38% of the initial impact still persists once all firms have had a chance to reset
their prices. This confirms the first-order autocorrelation predicted by equation (47).
We can also observe the effect of the monetary shock on pricing-to-market. Consider
a measure of pricing-to-market, r| n RW
￿|  R￿|, which is the foreign price of the home good
converted to home currency units as a ratio to the domestic price of the home good. This
measure increases 62% relative to steady state on impact and 16% in the subsequent period, so
that 27% of the initial impact persists.
Figure 3 shows responses in home and foreign output and the trade balance. Because
the money demand elasticity with respect to consumption is unity, nominal expenditure on
final output necessarily rises one percent. Part of this increased expenditure falls on imported
goods, so foreign output rises, though by a smaller magnitude because of the home bias in
consumption. Because the home price level adjusts 26% on impact, real final output rises by
74%. One year after the shock, once all firms have had a chance to reset their prices, still 48%
of the initial impact on home output persists.18
Analysis by simulation is no longer restricted to the simplifying assumptions necessary
for analytical solution. First, it is instructive to use simulations to confirm that the assumption
of incomplete markets is innocuous in the present context. Under the benchmark parameters,
limiting asset trade to noncontingent debt, a one-percent increase in home money causes a
4; Note that the autoregressive expression (49) applies to total world output, not to home output alone, which
does not follow a first-order autoregression in the model.
23long-run appreciation in the exchange rate. However, the magnitude is only 0.6%, two orders
of magnitude smaller than the impact effect on the real exchange rate. Further, the coefficient
@2 'f H still measures theconstant first-order autoregressivecoefficient ofthereal exchange
rate as it decays toward its new long-run steady state, if this is measured in percent deviations
from its new long-run steady state.
Second, it is instructive to confirm that the simplifying assumption of j￿ 'fis innocu-
ous. If just the value of j￿ is changed to the more plausible value of unity, the first-order
autoregressive coefficient for the real exchange rate falls only a small amount, from 0.38 to
0.35.
Lastly we confirm that our simplifying approximation of q   is innocuous. If instead
we use q 'f bS, the autoregressive coefficient for the real exchange rate falls only from 0.38
to 0.37.
3.3 Volatility
In addition to persistence, another prominent feature of movements in the real exchange





the nominal interest rate is unchanged from its steady state. The interest rate parity condition
(7) then implies that r|n￿ ' r| for all |, that the exchange rate jumps immediately to its new
long-run level.
Overshooting can be introduced by considering a more careful parameterization of pref-
erences related to money demand. The parameterization in the benchmark case assumes that
24theinterestelasticityofrealmoneybalances,*j2, isunity. Empiricalstudiesfindawiderange
of estimates: from 0.39 in Chari et al. (1998a) to 0.05 in Mankiw and Summers (1986). We
choose an intermediate value of 0.2 (j2 'D ). Empirical studies estimate that the income elas-
ticity of real money demand (j￿*j2 here) is about unity, so we also set j2 'D . This implies
that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is 0.2. This is low but is not
outside the wide range of values found by empirical studies. Our alternative parametrization
will also use the more plausible value of unity for j￿, discussed previously.
Under this parameterization, it is no longer true that interest rates are unaffected by the
monetary shock. If the home interest rate falls relative to the foreign interest rate, equilibrium
inthebondmarketrequiresthatbondholdersexpectafutureappreciationinthehomecurrency.
This implies that the depreciation on impact of the shock overshoots the long run level. Figure
4 shows that under this alternative parametrization the nominal exchange rate overshoots by
15%. The real exchange rate depreciation on impact is now 82%, higher than the 69% seen
previously. Further, the response in domestic output on impact has been dampened to 0.19%,
compared to 74% previously. As a result, the volatility of the real exchange rate in the period
of the shock now is between 4 and 5 times that in output, as seen in the data.
In addition, volatility interacts with persistence in two interesting ways. First volatility
seems to lower persistence. Simulation under the alternative parameterization still produces a
constantvaluefortheautocorrelationoftherealexchangerate,thoughhereitis0.31,lowerthan
the value of 0.38 in the benchmark case without overshooting. Recall the preceding argument
that openness reduces real exchange rate persistence by causing the relative price indexes to
adjust more quickly to a nominal devaluation. Here the fact that the nominal devaluation is
larger amplifies this tendency for price indexes to change, and thus to further undercut real
exchange rate persistence. Table 3 lists the autocorrelation for various choices of j￿ and j2.
A second interaction is that persistence seems to amplify volatility in the model. For
25example,persistencecanberaisedfrom0.17%to0.38%bychangingw fromunityto0.15. This
increased persistence raises overshooting from 10% to 15%. Intuitively, if the home interest
rate remains below the foreign counterpart for more periods, the domestic currency must be
expected to depreciate for several periods consecutively. As a result the initial overshooting
must be more extreme than if the interest differential were not persistent. This point has been
discussed by Chadha (1987) in the context of exogenous persistence.
4. Conclusion
The focus of this paper has been to seek an explanation for the high degree of persis-
tence observed in the real exchange rate. It is found that staggered price contracts combined
with pricing-to-market are able to generate significant persistence beyond the exogenously
imposed rigidity. Translog preferences are important for amplifying the effects of both these
mechanisms. The autocorrelation implied by the model replicates that exhibited in the data.
However, to some degree openness in the economy limits the degree of persistence in the real
exchange rate.
The paper has also considered the model’s implications for exchange rate volatility. It
is found that significant volatility can be replicated in the present model under reasonable
parameter values which generate exchange rate overshooting. In addition, volatility in the real
exchange rate is found to interact with persistence in two ways: while volatility further limits
the degreeof persistence, the degreeof persistencesomewhat amplifies thedegree of volatility.
In general, the model lends support to the idea that macroeconomic fundamentals can
help explain real exchange rate behavior, at least in the long run. Further, the model helps
explain why this long run is so far away.
265. Appendix
The dynamics of the system of price-setting equations (21, 22, 23, 24) may be character-
ized as follows. Defining the terms:





s￿| nE  R
W
￿￿| (56)



























































E2  wn  E  wE 












w nE  



























8 n MEU  Mu
3￿8
3￿C.| E6|n￿ n 6|n2 (60)




































8 n2 MEU  M
3￿8
3￿C6| (62)
In order to convert this two-variable system to a univariate equation, we pre-multiply by the
eigenvectors of M, which are the same as the eigenvectors of 8. By inspection, these are the
vectors ￿ 'E  c and 2 'E  c. Pre-multiplying the system above by ￿ yields
Z￿c| ' @￿Z￿c|3￿ nE  @￿6| (63)
while pre-multiplying by 2 yields
Z2c| ' @2Z2c|3￿ nE  @26| (64)
where Z￿c| ' Z| n ZW
|, Z2c| ' Z|  ZW
| ,a n d@￿and @2 are the respective eigenvalues of M.























Alternatively, under the assumption of incomplete markets, the analysis changes as fol-
lows. Because the risk-sharing condition (6) no longer holds, it is no longer true that the
28nominal exchange rate change equals that in money. Nevertheless, they move in a constant
proportion. Because there is no change in the nominal interest rate under the benchmark pa-
rameters, the interest rate parity condition (7) implies that the nominal exchange rate moves
immediately to its new long-run level. Defining B as the constant ratio r
6, the system of four
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The analysis of real exchange rate dynamics still applies, except that now
^| ' @2^|3￿ n

2
E n @2E6|  6|3￿nE B  E6|  @26|3￿ (68)
The term @2 still indicates a measure of persistence in real exchange rate deviations resulting
from a home money shock, once this is adjusted for the permanent effect to the steady state
(which equals E  @2EB  ).
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32Table 1: Basic Data
Autocorrelation: Real Exchange Rate
Canada France Germ. Italy Japan U.K. Average
    1 qtr. 0.88 0.78 0.74 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.80
    4 qtr 0.34 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.28 0.27 0.27
Autocorrelation: Real GDP
Canada France Germ. Italy Japan U.K. Average
    1 qtr. 0.89 0.84 0.74 0.83 0.67 0.85 0.80
    4 qtr. 0.29 0.21 0.24 -0.04 0.12 0.44 0.21
Standard Deviation
Canada France Germ. Italy Japan U.K. Average
RER / GDP 2.05 7.57 4.35 4.26 5.87 4.79 4.81
All data are quarterly series from IFS, 1973:1 – 1997:3. Series are logged and Hodrick-Prescott
filtered. The real exchange rate is computed as the CPI-adjusted nominal exchange rate.Real Exchange Rate Autocorrelations
Analytical Solution*




































































)Table 3: Simulation Results
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Figure 2: Exchange Rate Responses
Benchmark Parameterization*
nominal exchange rate
Response to a permanent 1% increase in nominal money supply.
One group resets price in initial period; both groups have reset price
one year after shock.
*Parameters: sigma1 = sigma2 = 1, sigma3 = 0, theta = 0.85,
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Response to a permanent 1% increase in nominal money supply.
One group resets price in initial period; both groups have reset price
one year after shock.
*Parameters: sigma1 = sigma2 = 1, sigma3 = 0, theta = 0.85,
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Figure 4: Exchange Rate Responses
Alternative Parameterization*
nominal exchange rate
Response to a permanent 1% increase in nominal money supply.
One group resets price in initial period; both groups have reset price
one year after shock.
*Parameters: sigma1 = sigma2 = 5, sigma3 = 1, theta = 0.85,
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Response to a permanent 1% increase in nominal money supply.
One group resets price in initial period; both groups have reset price
one year after shock.
*Parameters: sigma1 = sigma2 = 5, sigma3 = 1, theta = 0.85,
phi = 0.15, gamma = 2, beta = 0.96.
135